He has some interesting thoughts about the impact of the idea of evolution on the notion of human value and dignity. If you believe that we are the result of the natural processes of cause and effect, you end up with a serious problem with value, purpose, worth and dignity. It is hard to argue that someone who is an accident of the universe has some kind of special destiny.

One idea that is being tossed about by scientist Paul Davies in Are We Alone? Philosophical Implications of the Discovery of Extra-Terrestrial Life is that no extraterrestrials have been discovered, but Davies is reflecting on what the philosophical implications would be if such life was found. He believes a couple of things about this issue.

By the way, we have no evidence whatsoever that there is life any other place than earth. There is no concrete evidence. What we have is speculation based on a commitment to evolution. If evolution did produce life on this planet, and the universe is as vast as it seems to be, then it must have happened in other places. There must be billions upon billions of other planets much like ours that have been throwing the dice of chance for billions upon billions of years so that life inevitability would evolve.

That doesn't take into consideration a whole bunch of mitigating factors like the anthropic principle, for example. It seems that so many things in the universe, especially in our solar system, are very, very finely tuned for life . If things were just a little bit different on a number of different parameters, life would not be able to survive. So it doesn't seem to be the case that there would be billions of planets just like earth that would give rise to life. The conditions under which life could exist are so finely tuned that it would change the calculations considerably. As a matter of fact, I think when all of those factors (and there are over 300 parameters) are taken into consideration, it shows that it is rather remarkable that life would occur anywhere. It becomes an argument for design, quite honestly. That's the best application of the so- called anthropic principle.

In any event, Davies presumes that there must be life out there and he considers what the implications for our view of life and dignity would be? The book is reviewed by Lee Denbar of the L.A. Times. Lee doesn't hold with the same views that Davies does, and that really is the topic of my commentary.

Davies says this: "The most important upshot of the discovery of extra-terrestrial life would be to restore to human beings something of the dignity of which science has robbed them."

The acknowledgment that science robs human beings of their dignity is quite remarkable for a scientist to make.

Why does science rob human beings of their dignity? Science has limited its area of study to the area of natural occurrences. Not only has it limited its search to that area, but it has essentially said that that is the only area that really exits. This is called philosophic naturalism. If only nature exists, then it turns out that we are merely parts of the machinery in the workings of nature, and we are the unwitting victims of the machinery of cause and effect happening over time without any plan. That robs human beings of their dignity. Clearly, if we are the product of chance, then we have no purpose. It seems hard to argue that we are anything different than anything else on this earth that has resulted from the process of evolution.

The claim that we have some kind of peculiar dignity turns out to be a kind of species-ism. We arbitrarily view our species as qualitatively more valuable than other species, but the fact of the matter is that in nature that just isn't the case. Davies acknowledges that if we are stuck with philosophic naturalism, we are robbed of unique value and dignity, and we become one of many living organisms that are qualitatively indistinguishable.

One might argue that we are more sophisticated in our evolutionary accomplishment, but what separates us from the rest? Nothing. That's a value judgment, and there are no value judgments like that that make any sense in nature because nature is value-less. Values are a philosophic construct. They are a theological and moral notion and have no place, strictly speaking, in a world that is simply defined by scientific law.

Davies bemoans such a loss and wonders how we get this back. He concludes that if we discover ET, we will somehow restore human value and dignity. I'm at a loss to understand how the discovery of extra-terrestrial life is going to make us feel more valuable.

There is a mystifying statement made by the reviewer. In response to Paul Davies's speculation, Denbar writes, "Now as for me, I share the view Davies opposes. Namely, that life is a pointless accident, but I do not feel in any way robbed of dignity as a result. When Copernicus took the earth out of the center of the universe, should people have felt robbed of dignity as a result? When Darwin showed that human beings were just the latest creatures in a long line of evolution, should people have felt robbed of dignity as a result? Davies wants to re-impose a religious sensibility into these questions that science has finally managed to discard. Davies may find such thinking comforting. The standard scientific view finds it useless at best, dangerous at worst."

This is an absolutely remarkable thing to say, ladies and gentlemen. First, he says, I'm not with Davies, I believe we are a result of pointless accidents. But I don't see how that has anything to do with my dignity as a human being. After all, when we learned that the earth was not the center of the solar system, that didn't change our sense of human dignity. In like manner, when we learned that we had evolved according to Darwin, why should that change my sense of dignity? In fact, it is good that we don't impose any kind of religious or metaphysical notions. Thankfully, science got rid of that.

He admits that science has stripped us of such things and it is good that it did. There is a serious problem with this. First of all, I don't understand the parallel between evolution and the location of the center of the solar system. Why would anybody really hold that it makes a difference to human dignity or worth where we are located? In other words, I agree with him entirely. There is no sense that I lose any personal dignity or worth because I feel like I'm located in the outer ring of the solar system rather than the center of the solar system. Physical location doesn't have anything whatsoever to do with what I am.

Where I am doesn't dictate what I am, which by the way is one of my arguments against abortion. Why is a 20 week old preemie protected because it is outside of the womb and a 20 week old gestation unborn child is not protected inside the womb? They are the same thing, they are just in a different location. It is ludicrous to argue that location makes a difference in the value of thing.

But having said that, Dunbar feels that he has made a case for the unreasonableness of asserting human dignity. Why would anyone say it is of no consequence to his innate value and dignity if his ancestor was pond scum. Somebody's worth and dignity is not determined by their location because what they are is what is critical.

But the second issue has to do with what they are. I evolved from slime. Who could possibly say that that kind of truth (if it is a truth) has no relationship to my value and dignity? If I am the product of chance, then I am product of chance. Chance is chance. If you are the product of chance, then you weren't planned, and a thing that is not planned can't have a destiny.

A thing that happens by accident has no innate value because innate value must come from somewhere else. Accidents and the product of accidents have no value. If there is value, then where does it come from?

Here is another way of looking at it. If I wasn't planned, I just happened and I have no purpose or destiny. Guess what that makes me? What that makes all of us? We are all unwanted pregnancies. Isn't that true? Mother nature didn't want us. It didn't want us, it just had us. It just spewed us forth. It just unconsciously squeezed us out. We were the thoughtless conceptus of intercourse of blind natural compulsions with no thought given to us, strangers who accidentally bump into each other in the dark of the universe. We are bastards of the one-night stand if evolution is true.

That is what we are if we evolved. Where does someone find unique human dignity in that? Where is it?

Lee Dunbar is victimized by a way of thinking that the late Dr. Francis Schaeffer understood very well. When I ask the question, How can he say that? I can tell you how he'd say that. Francis Schaeffer explained it three decades ago in a book called Escape from Reason . Schaeffer understood that modern man is schizoid in his thinking. He has split the world into two areas. He called it the upper story and the lower story.

The lower story was the natural world, the mechanized world of cause and effect. In the upper story you have meaning and significance, values and morality, the world of religion, the world of God, the world of faith.

Davies laments the destruction of human dignity when living in the lower story, the natural world, the world of science, because in fact it does destroy it. He is hoping for a way to find some reason in nature for human dignity and value.

He is working to do something reasonable when modern man has escaped reason because most modern men are willing to say we are alone in the universe. We are simply the result of blind chance. Yet, even though that gives us no reason for value, we are going to assert our value. We are going to pretend. We are going to take, as Schaeffer called it, a blind leap of faith into the upper story of value, significance and dignity.

Of course the problem is that there is no relationship between the upper story and the lower story. There is no point of justification in the real world for that which you believe in the upper story. That is why, in order to seize upon value in the upper story, you must make a blind leap of faith. Schaeffer calls this the upper story leap because all statements about worth, value, dignity and significance have no relationship to the real world. That's the point of the upper story leap.

It seems that Dunbar is almost saying here that if you believe God made you and that is what gives you dignity, then that is your leap of faith, but it has nothing to do with reality. Go ahead. Believe it. That is your belief. Now, even if I think I evolved, I think I still have dignity, and that is my leap of faith. Neither leap has anything to do with reality.

Folks, it shows how people have thoroughly bought this schizoid way of looking at life. There is no integration between faith and reason. On the lower story, mechanistic world of cause and effect it's not just that there is no place for human dignity, worth and value. In that context, they are words that make no sense. These notions of value, dignity and worth have nothing to do with the world that we live in. All of these kinds of statements are just wild imaginations. Wishful thinkings. Inventions. They are useful fictions that we fool ourselves with.

The Christian can fool himself with the idea of God; the evolutionist can fool himself with the idea of value of a different sort. But both are merely fooling ourselves because in the real world there is nothing like genuine value or dignity. None of it really matches reality.

In that context I can see how Dunbar can say, Why should I lose my sense of dignity because I think I evolved? My dignity doesn't rest on anything real anyway. I can invent dignity as an evolutionist just as easily as any theist can invent dignity. I believe it, that is all the justification I need.

I mentioned a couple of weeks ago that in the search for truth, only one discipline has been allowed to play. One discipline and only one discipline. The discipline is science as interpreted by naturalism. Dr. J.P. Moreland, philosopher and apologist, in his book, Christianity and the Nature of Science, makes a point that is very important for us to consider. It's about the notion which he calls an external conceptual problem. Here's how that works. Science, as a vehicle for truth, comes to the conclusion that man has no worth or value, nothing unique, no ultimate dignity. You have to invent it. You can't get it from the natural world.

But, Moreland argues, we have reason to believe that man is more than just the sum of his parts. He is not just physical, he is not just a creature that has no special place in the universe. Moral motions mean something. There does seem to be a morality that applies to human beings. Human beings do seem to have a qualitative value different than everything else.

If there is good reason, whether theological or philosophical, to argue for the fact that human beings are not just simply the blind conceptus of an uncaring universe, then those become arguments against this scientific point of view. In other words, they become what Moreland calls an external conceptual problem. It's a problem that is external to the discipline of science, but an argument that has merits in itself, even though it is not a scientific argument, strictly speaking, and therefore ought to be allowed to weigh in against the so-called conclusions of science.

Another way of saying it is, a good philosophical or theological argument is a legitimate rebuttal to a scientific argument that comes to an opposing conclusion. Now, of course, this is an appeal to open the field and let other disciplines play in the search for truth other than simply science. Once you do that, it changes the game considerably.